THE CHARGING PARTY BEFORE THE NLRB:
A PRIVATE RIGHT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The exclusive power to resolve disputes rising under the National
Labor Relations Act' (with which the NLRB has been entrusted) has
generated confusion over the rights of private participants in the disputesettling process. The statute explicitly grants procedural protections
only to the party charged with an unfair labor practice; 2 it leaves
unclear the status of the injured "charging party." While the charging
party's interest in participating in unfair labor practice proceedings
has been recognized at various stages of the Board's procedure, the
Board has sometimes felt constrained by what it considers the public
interest in efficient administration to limit the role which the private
party is permitted to play. This tension is highlighted by conflicting
interpretations by courts of appeal on the issue of whether a charging
party has a right to be heard when the Board attempts to settle a
complaint directly with the charged party.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet dealt with this problem,
it has characterized the right to be free from unfair labor practices
as "public" rather than "private,"8 thereby possibly giving rise to the
inference that the extent of the charging party's participation in the
resolution of a dispute is solely a matter for administrative discretion.
Unfortunately, however, the rhetoric of public and private rights has
obscured thorough analysis of the relationship between existing dispute
settlement procedures and the sometimes conflicting interests of the
charging party and the Board. By focusing on the charging party's
right to a hearing, this comment examines the NLRB procedural
scheme in the light of these conflicting interests. It concludes that not
only do compelling policy considerations support a hearing when the
charging party objects to a proposed settlement, but also that in light
of existing administrative regulations a hearing is required by law.
I
A review of relevant NLRB procedures will provide the context in
which this problem can most instructively be considered. Such a pre1 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1958). (Hereafter cited only
to U.S.C.)
2 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)(1958).
3 See, e.g., Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261

(1940).
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liminary account is useful here not only because it dramatizes the
problem by disclosing readily apparent inconsistencies in the charging
party's procedural status, but also because it reveals a de facto separation
of functions within the NLRB which is of assistance in resolving the
troublesome discrepancies posed.
The responsibility for investigating and prosecuting unfair labor
practice charges under the NLRA is lodged in the office of the NLRB's
General Counsel. 4 Any person who alleges that he has been aggrieved
by an unfair labor practice may file with the General Counsel the
charge necessary to activate the Board machinery. 5 A charge is processed
through the General Counsel's regional offices, which are accorded
substantial independence in decision-making: they are not under the
direct supervision of the Board, and the charging party retains only
limited power over the prosecution of his own case. Although a certain
degree of responsibility is conferred on the charging party in that he
must ensure that there is timely service of his charge on the charged
party and prompt submission of evidence, 6 he may thereafter affect
the course of the General Counsel's conduct only by requesting withdrawal of the charge.7 Even so, the General Counsel can refuse to
permit the charge to be withdrawn.8 Entirely within the General
Counsel's discretion are whether a formal complaint will issue and
4 See Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1958).
One major purpose of this legislation was to divide between the General Counsel and
the rest of the Board the functions of investigator, prosecutor and judge. The General Counsel essentially took over operational control of the agency, exercising "general
supervision over all attorneys employed by the Board . . . and over the officers and
employees in the regional offices." Ibid. The function of the General Counsel has been
compared to that of a district attorney. See ROSENFARB, THE NATIONAL LABOR PoLIcY &
How IT WORKS 615 (1940). Although acting in the name of the Board, his actions
were to be independent of Board control. The provision "effectively limits the Board
to the performance of quasi-judicial functions." H.R. RElP. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist
Sess. 38 (1947). See also Frito Co., W. Div. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 458, 462 (9th Cir. 1964);
International Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 757, 761 (D.C. Cir.
1960); Haleston Drug Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 815 (1951). For a general discussion of the separation provisions and their
effect, see Rodgers, Later History and Development of the NLRB, 29 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 252, 256-65 (1960).
5 24 Fed. Reg. 9102 (1959), 29 C.F.R. § 102.9 (1965). See, e.g., NLRB v. Swift & Co.,
233 F.2d 226, 231 (8th Cir. 1956); NLRB v. Kobritz, 193 F.2d 8, 15 (Ist Cir. 1951); Consumers Power Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 38, 42 (6th Cir. 1940); NLRB v. National Licorice
Co., 104 F.2d 655, 658 (2d Cir. 1939), afJ'd, 309 U.S. 350 (1940); NLRB v. Hopwood Retinning Co., 98 F.2d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1938).
6 24 Fed. Reg. 9095 (1959), 29 C.F.R. § 101.40 (1965).
7 24 Fed. Reg. 9095 (1959), 29 C.F.R. § 101.5 (1965).
8 "Any such charge may be withdrawn, prior to the hearing, only with the consent
of the regional director with whom the charge was filed . . ." 29 Fed. Reg. 9102 (1959),
29 C.F.R. § 102.9 (1965). NLRB v. Wemyss, 212 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1954); NLRB v.
Kobritz, 193 F.2d 8, 15 (Ist Cir. 1951).
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what it will contain: 9 if after a full investigation' the regional director
of the General Counsel's office decides that the charge is legally suffi.
cient to constitute an unfair labor practice and that evidence is available to support a reasonable conclusion that the alleged violation
occurred, he may either attempt to resolve the issue informally or may
issue a formal complaint."' Should the regional director refuse to issue
the complaint, the only recourse open to the charging party is to appeal
5
2
to the General Counsel,' whose decision is final and unappealable.'
Once the proceeding enters the adjudicative stage, effective control
passes out of the hands of the General Counsel into those of the
trial examiner and the Board. After the trial examiner's hearing on
the formal complaint begins the regional director lacks even the power
14
to withdraw a complaint on his own motion; to do so, or to amend,
settle or dismiss a complaint requires the approval of the adjudicative
officers of the Board.' 5 After the hearing, which is held before a trial
16
examiner in accordance with NLRA provisions as amplified by agency
8
17
the trial examiner
and the Administrative Procedure Act,'
rules

9 Piasecki Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 280 F.2d 575, 588 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 933 (1961).
-0 24 Fed. Reg. 9095 (1959), 29 C.F.R. § 101.4 (1965). For a general description of
the investigative procedure, see Statement of NLRB General Counsel to House Labor
1150.03.
Subcommittee on the NLRB, June 29, 1961, CCH LAB. L. REP.
"1 24 Fed. Reg. 9095 (1959), 29 C.F.R. §§ 101A, 101.8 (1965).
12 24 Fed. Reg. 9095 (1959), 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.6, 101.7 (1965).
13 See, e.g., Wellington Mill Div., West Point Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 579, 590
(4th Cir. 1964); Division 1267, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Ordman, 320
F.2d 729, 730 (D.C. Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Local 182, Teamsters Union, 314 F.2d 53, 60
(2d Cir. 1963); Retail Store Employees Union, Local 954 v. Rothman, 298 F.2d 330
(D.C. Cir. 1962); Bandlow v. Rothman, 278 F.2d 866 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
909 (1960). While no court has yet ordered the General Counsel to issue a complaint,
the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia intimated that the district court
might properly review the General Counsel's decision on the question of an abuse of
discretion in an extreme situation. Retail Stores Employees Union v. Rothman,
supra. The existence of such jurisdiction is generally denied, and, at best, has been
referred to as dubious. See NLRB v. Local 182, Teamsters Union, supra.
14 He may withdraw a complaint at any time before the hearing on his own motion. 24 Fed. Reg. 9102 (1959), 29 C.F.R. § 102.18 (1965).
15 24 Fed. Reg. 9102 (1959), 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.9, 102.17 (1965); General Maintenance
Engineers, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 295 (1963); Otis L. Broyhill Furniture Co., 94 N.L.R.B.
1452 (1951); United Aircraft Corp., 91 N.L.R.B. 215 (1950).
16 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1958).
24 Fed. Reg. 9095 (1959), 29 C.F.R. § 101.10 (1965).
18 The APA hearing requirements, 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (1964), apply
to all agencies unless expressly superseded by subsequent legislation respecting a particular agency, 60 Stat. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1011 (1964) or unless expressly excluded
from the APA definition of "agency," 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 1001
(1964).
17
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forwards to the Board his findings and a recommended disposition. 9
The charging party's rights are given formal recognition: he is permitted to file exceptions and a supporting brief with the Board on any
matter contained in the trial examiner's decision.2 0 The Board, in
response to the charging party's request, may open the record to receive
additional evidence 2 ' and may also grant permission for limited oral
argument.22 Furthermore, the charging party is accorded one final
protection: as a "person aggrieved" he may obtain review in a United
23
States Court of Appeals of the Board's final order.
II
In a recent opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
denied the charging party a right to be heard when over his objection
the Board and the charged party proposed to enter into a consent
order. 24 This decision conflicts directly with a long-standing Third
Circuit rule permitting such a hearing.25 Since either the trial examiner,
19 28 Fed. Reg. 7973 (1963), 29 C.F.R. § 102.45 (1965).
28 Fed. Reg. 7973 (1963), as amended, 29 C.F.R. § 102A6 (1965).
21 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1958); 28 Fed. Reg. 7974 (1963), 29 C.F.R. § 102A8(b) (1965).
22 28 Fed. Reg. 7973 (1963), as amended, 29 C.F.R. § 102A6(i) (1965).
23 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1958). The charging party has generally been acknowledged to
be a "person aggrieved" if the final order is adverse to his interests. See, e.g., American
Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 100 (1953); Amalgamated Utility
Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 266 (1940). The court may review
the order immediately or return the record to the Board for the introduction of additional evidence. 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e), (f) (1958).
Even this right to judicial review is limited, however, by the fact that only the Board
is authorized to seek enforcement of a favorable court order. Amalgamated Utility
Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 269-70 (1940). Denying beneficiaries
of an NLRB order the right to petition the courts for enforcement has been criticized
in Jaffe, The Public Right Dogma in Labor Board Cases, 59 HARv. L. Rav. 720, 727-28
(1946) and 3 DAvis, ADMINSRATIVE LAW § 22.13, at 273-75 (1958).
The charging party has also been refused the right to intervene in instances where
the Board sought a judicial enforcement order. See Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 339
F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1964); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. NLRB, 267 F.2d 169 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom., Geilich Tanning Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 361 U.S. 863
(1959); Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. NLRB, 132 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1942). But see
Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. NLRB, 210 F.2d 852 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub noma.,
Kearney-Trecker Employees, UAW v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 824 (1954); West Texas Utilities
Co. v. NLRB, 184 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 939 (1951) where
uncontested interventions were allowed. While the technical arguments evoked by this
denial of a hearing before the courts are quite different from those proposed to support the right to a hearing before the Board, many of the same policy considerations
apply in both situations.
24 Local 282, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1964).
25 Marine Engineers' Beneficial Ass'n v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 546 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 819 (1953). The case was noted with apparent approval in Piasecki Aircraft
Corp. v. NLRB, 280 F.2d 575, 588-89 (3d Cir. 1960) and in International Union of
Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 757, 760 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1960). Cf. UAW v. NLRB,
231 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1956).
20
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the Board, or the court has the discretionary power to provide the
opportunity for a hearing to the charging party,26 the issue narrows
to whether the opportunity to be heard should be one granted as of
right or granted at the discretion of adjudicative officials at some
stage in the process. Careful analysis of the decision not only resolves
the particular problem but sheds much-needed light on the general
confusion surrounding the status of the charging party.
The Third Circuit initially resolved the problem in 1953 by giving
full support to the charging party's right to be heard. In Marine
Engineers' Beneficial Ass'n v. NLRB 27 a union filed unfair labor practice charges against a division of the International Longshoreman's
Association. After the issuance of a complaint, the Longshoremen and
the regional director entered into a stipulation agreement despite the
charging party's objection and request for a hearing. The Board sub28
sequently denied the request for a hearing and entered a consent order,
from which the charging party appealed to the court. In concluding
that the union was entitled to a hearing, the court took notice of the
public nature of the Board's functions but ruled that sections of the
Administrative Procedure Act which protect the right to be heard
when parties are unable to "determine any controversy by consent" 29
controlled the procedural aspects of the dispute unless expressly superseded by the NLRA.3 0 Reading the APA provisions in conjunction
with the NLRA right to petition for judicial review, the court stated:
[T]he charging party, after complaint is issued, does have some
standing. The Board may refuse to do anything about his
complaint . . . . But once it does, and once it goes to the
extent of filing a complaint....
he is entitled to have a chance
to be heard as the Administrative Procedure Act requires.
He has a right to object if after hearing he does not like
the result. But he certainly has nothing on which to base
26 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e), (f) (1958); 24 Fed. Reg. 9102 (1959), as amended, 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.35 (1965); 28 Fed. Reg. 7973 (1963), 29 C.F.R. § 102.45 (1965); 28 Fed. Reg. 7973
(1963), as amended, 29 C.F.R. § 102A6 (1965).
27 202 F.2d 546 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953).
28 A consent order is issued by the Board pursuant to settlement stipulations which
provide for a Board order. 24 Fed. Reg. 9095 (1959), 29 C.F.R. § 101.9 (1965). "The
entry of the order upon stipulation and consent does not detract from its force."
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 159 (1941).
29 60 Stat. 239, 241, 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1004, 1006, 1007 (1964). The right to a
hearing includes the right to present evidence, submit rebuttal evidence, and conduct
cross-examination. 60 Stat. 241 (1946); 5 U.S.C. § 1006(c) (1964).
30 "No subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of this chapter except to the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly."
60 Stat. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1011 (1964).
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his objections unless there is a hearing and a record is made so
that the court has something to go on.31
The court's language indicates that it may have based its recognition
of the right to a hearing on two different grounds.32 First, the court
apparently was saying that the only way to give meaning to the charging
party's right under the NLRA to seek judicial review is to create a
record for the courts to canvass on appeal. Second, it can convincingly
be argued that since the Board has designated charging parties as
parties to the proceedings 33 they are entitled to the full procedural
rights, which include the right to be heard, guaranteed by the APA to
"any person or agency named or admitted as a party." 34
After eight years without successful judicial challenge, the Marine
Engineers rule was diluted by Textile Workers v. NLRB. 35 Here the
charging party objected to a consent order and on review the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia ordered the Board either to grant
the charging party a reasonable opportunity to be heard on its objection
to the consent order or to enter upon the record the reasons for accepting the stipulation as the basis for the order despite the union's
objections. The court conceded that it was unclear whether the charging party's consent to the stipulation was required, although it did
state that subject to restriction in the public interest "the charging
party, even though he may not veto a settlement, is given the opportufity for submission of facts and argument, and is recognized as having
a substantial part in assisting the Board in fulfilling its public re31 202 F.2d at 549.
32 Although the court relied primarily on the rationale that the charging party
had a legal right to be heard, it did attempt to dispose of the efficiency argument and
other policy considerations: "This [result], we think, will not seriously interfere with
the efficient working of an administrative body. And it will, in our judgment, tend
to give the party who feels himself injured and has made a complaint a better chance
to have his complaint remedied." Id. at 550.
33 The Board regulations state that "the term 'party' as used herein shall mean
the regional director in whose region the proceeding is pending and any person named
or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted
as a party, in any Board proceeding, including, without limitation, any person filing
a charge or petition under the act .... " 24 Fed. Reg. 9102 (1959), 29 C.F.R. § 102.8
(1965). It should be noted that by retention of this rule despite a recommendation
made by an external investigating committee that charging parties not be designated
as "parties" the Board indicated that it was administratively desirable to assure the
participation of the charging party. See ATrY. GEN. COMMITTE ON ADMINIsTRATIVE PROCEDuRE, NATIONAL LABOR RELATioNS BOARD 30-32 (1940). While the right to participate

as a party is not statutory and is therefore susceptible to extinction in the exercise
of the Board's rule making discretion, this past conduct indicates that such change
might be undesirable even from the Board's point of view.
34 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964).
35 294 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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sponsibilities." Unlike Marine Engineers, however, the Textile Workers
opinion does not rely on the applicability of the APA. Both a Board
regulation and section 1004(b) of the APA afford parties the opportunity for voluntary settlement except where time, the nature of the
proceedings, and the public interest require other action.37 Textile
Workers resolved the question on the basis of the Board regulation
alone, failing to recognize that a distinct basis for requiring a hearing
on the merits is found in the APA. As Marine Engineers recognized,
although the right to be heard at settlement proceedings might properly
be curtailed, the additional right given under the APA to be heard on
the merits by the adjudicative officer prior to the final disposition is
legally required "to the extent that the parties are unable to determine
any controversy by consent."
If the Marine Engineers reasoning was weakened by Textile Workers,
it was wholly rejected by the Second Circuit in Local 282, Teamsters
Union v. NLRB. 38 In Teamsters, the regional director entered into
a stipulation with the charged party, an employer, which provided
for rehiring and back pay for certain workers who had been improperly
discharged. After the union objected that the stipulation did not provide reinstatement and back pay for other workers who had engaged
in a second strike,3 9 the regional director amended the complaint to
delete allegations stating that the second strike had been provoked
by unfair labor practices and that those workers had also been improperly discharged. 40 Thereupon the union, complaining that it had
been given inadequate opportunity to present its objections to the Board,
petitioned the court for review. In order to safeguard itself by complying
with the Textile Workers rule that reasons be stated for the denial of a
at 740.
Compare "[A]fter the complaint has been issued and a hearing scheduled or even
begun, the attorney in charge of the case and the regional director afford all parties
every opportunity for the submission, and consideration of facts, argument, offers of
settlement, or proposals of adjustment, except where time, the nature of the proceeding, and the public interest do not permit," 24 Fed. Reg. 9095 (1959), 29 C.F.R. §
101.9(a) (1965), with "The agency shall afford all interested parties opportunity for
(1) the submission and consideration of facts, arguments, offers of settlement, or proposals of adjustment where time, the nature of the proceeding, and the public interest permit, and (2) to the extent that the parties are unable so to determine any
controversy by consent, hearing, and decision upon notice and in conformity with
sections 1006 and 1007 of this title." 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(b) (1964).
38 339 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1964).
36 Id.
37

39 339 F.2d at 798.
40 While the amendment might artificially serve to distinguish this case, the opinion
properly avoids any such distinction. A decision to amend a complaint and grant
full relief on the remaining allegations is in substance the same as granting full relief
for only a portion of the original allegations.
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hearing, the Board successfully sought an extension of time in which to
file supplemental information setting forth in detail the basis for its
approval of the settlement stipulation.41 Thereafter the court denied
the union's petition for review and held that the Board had the power
to enter into settlements over the objection of the charging parties
without affording a hearing.
In contrast to Textile Workers, the court met the issue of APA
relevance head-on. Instead, however, of finding the APA to be controlling, it attempted to demonstrate that it did not apply on the ground
that a charging party is not entitled to the procedural protections
granted to a party by the APA. This conclusion is maintainable
theoretically because the APA requires that a party be "interested" to
qualify for the procedural protections it grants. 42 But that the distinc-

tion drawn by the court between a party who is "adversely affected
or aggrieved" 43 and one who is "interested" is questionable at best is
evinced by the court's own admission that the distinction is easier to
state than to apply.4 4 Furthermore, the court's central proposition
that the right to procedural protections afforded "interested parties"
by the APA enures only if the party has a substantive private right
is impaired by the fact that the court relied on precedent of dubious
relevance to buttress its contention: L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pacific
4
R.R.,
5 the single case cited as authority for this extremely limited
concept of "interest," simply held that the particular complainants did
not have "some special and peculiar interest which may be directly
and materially affected by the alleged unlawful action." 46 Since an un339 F.2d at 799.
60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(b) (1964).
43 The language is taken from those sections of the APA and the NLRA which
create a right to judicial review for persons "adversely affected or aggrieved," 60 Stat.
243, (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(2) (1964); or persons "aggrieved," 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).
44 339 F.2d at 800.
45 311 U.S. 295 (1940).
46 311 U.S. at 304. The issue in the case was whether § 402 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 52 Stat. 980 (1938), gave a produce merchant located and doing business
in one city a right to bring an injunctive action against the construction of a railroad
to serve a new market in another city. The statute grants such a right only to a
"party in interest." On the basis of this wording, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the "interest" required was a legislatively-created private right, finding
support in language in Western Pacific California R.R. v. Southern Pacific Co., 284
U.S. 44, 51 (1931) to the effect that the requisite interest is present when "some
definite legal right possessed by [the] complainant is seriously threatened or that the
unauthorized and therefore illegal action of the defendant carrier may directly and
adversely affect the complainant's welfare." (Emphasis added.) If any analogy at all
can be drawn between Teamsters and the Singer case it might be between the complainants in Singer and a customer of the offending employer or a creditor of the
union who might be injured by the results of an unfair labor practice in Teamsters.
41
42
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fair labor practice may indubitably affect the charging party in a substantial way, even under the reasoning of the Singer case the charging
party should be granted a right to be heard.
As the Teamsters rationale for denying the applicability of the APA
can be rejected, it follows that the APA should properly be found controlling. Since the APA specifically grants the right to a hearing by the
adjudicative officer subsequent to a settlement proceeding "to the extent
47
that the parties are unable to determine any controversy by consent,"
the Marine Engineers rule seems to be legally required. But since there
exist many inconsistencies in the procedural status of the charging party,
and since the cases on the subject are in some disarray, it is desirable to
examine broader policy considerations both for and against such hearings. It is in this context that the perception of Marine Engineers that the
right to judicial review accorded to parties whose charge has reached the
complaint stage would be meaningless were the charging party not permitted to enter its objections on the record assumes independent
significance.
III
Characterization of the right to protection in the collective bargaining
relationship as public in nature has permeated judicial consideration
of procedural conflicts arising under the National Labor Relations Act
for more than two decades; 48 the decision in Teamsters that the right
to appeal as a "person aggrieved" is an action to vindicate "not a
private, but a public right" reflects the continuing effect of that
Furthermore, the case should be distinguished because it dealt not with procedural
Tights such as those under consideration here but instead with a substantive right. Even
on the narrow point of standing to bring an administrative action, the case has been
criticized. See 3 DAvis, ADnNIsTRATIvE LAW § 22.11, at 263-65 (1958).
47 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1964). Such consent would waive a right to
be heard. 24 Fed. Reg. 9095 (1959), 29 C.F.R. § 101.9(b) (1965). Textile Workers recognized that "provision of section 101.9(b) for waiver of the right to hearing plainly
applies only where the parties have consented to a settlement," and further that "the
charging party has not done so in our case." This would negate interpretation of
Textile Workers as an implied waiver case. The regulation would also seem to support
the view that a right to a hearing remains in effect absent a waiver.
48 An early case which forcefully propounded this concept was Amalgamated
Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 (1940), where the court
quoted from the report of the Committee on Labor of the House of Representatives,
H.R. REP. No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1935): "No private right of action is contemplated. Essentially the unfair labor practices listed are matters of public concern,
by their nature and consequences, present or potential; the proceeding is in the name
of the Board, upon the Board's formal complaint. The form of injunctive and affirmative order is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the bill to remove obstructions to
interstate commerce which are by the law declared to be detrimental to the public
weal." 309 U.S. at 267-68. See also Haleston Drug Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 418, 420
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951).
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appellation. 49 Yet to rely on the labeling of a right as public or private
neglects analysis of the basic interests involved.
Whatever one's framework for analysis and eventual conclusion,
the starting point is indisputable: it cannot be gainsaid that the NLRA
was intended to serve the public purpose of removing burdens on the
economy resulting from industrial strife.5 0 Sound reasons existed at
the time the National Labor Relations Act was passed for committing
the regulation of collective bargaining to the discretion of a single
expert group concerned with broader considerations than the interests
of the individual conflicting parties. Labor relations were in a highly
volatile state and previous governmental efforts to remedy the situation
had proved ineffective. 51 To avoid the doctrinal confusion inherent in
a system of dispersed authority it was thought important that a single
body develop uniform law regarding collective bargaining. 52 But the
Board's budget and facilities were limited. To allocate its resources most
effectively, irresponsible charges leading to fruitless litigation had to
be eliminated; also, it was obviously desirable to limit concurrent
attacks on a single point of unclear law when a single case would
53
resolve the matter.
More than that of any other federal agency, NLRB procedure
continues today to make a distinction between "public" and "private
rights" significant to persons who have legally-protected interests. The
NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over regulation of collective bargaining: 54 the states are preempted from extending relief,55 and injured
parties may not seek private relief in the federal courts.56 This strict
limitation on redress available to interested parties is unusual. Although individual citizens have no right actively to seek punishment
for a person who commits a crime, nearly all crimes have an analogy
49 339 F.2d at 799.

50 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
51 See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-6 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 972, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-6 (1935).
52 See S. REP., supra note 51, at 15; Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490
(1953). See generally Rothman, The National Labor Relations Board and Administrative Law, 29 GEo. WVASH.L. REv. 301-04 (1960).
53 See statement by NLRB General Counsel to the House Labor Subcommittee on
the NLRB, June 29, 1961, CCH LAB. L. REp. 1150.
54 29 U.S.C. 160(a) (1964); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236 (1959).
55 See, e.g., Construction and General Laborers' Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963);
Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957).
56 E.g., Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 491 (1953). See generally Meltzer,
The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations, (pts. 1-2)
59 CoLui. L. REv. 6,269 (1959).
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applies to conduct regulated by most

administrative agencies. The NLRA may be the exception that proves
the rule: the NLRB is one of the very few public agencies entrusted with
the sole enforcement of a policy the purpose of which is to guarantee
both individual and group interests. 58

In any attempt to analyze the rights associated with a particular interest under the NLRA, Professor Jaffe's recognition that "private
and public interests are, both in a substantive and a procedural sense,
aspects of the totality of the legal order" 59 should be borne in mind.
Even if it is granted that a major purpose of the NLRA was to eliminate
burdens on the national economy, it may not be inconsistent to recognize other goals embodied in

the act. The sanctions available under

the NLRA, for example, extend beyond those typical of public enforcement: they are not considered punishment, 0 nor is relief limited
to injunctions. An important remedial purpose is served by making
individual redress available to injured parties.6 ' In this respect the

right to judicial review granted parties whose charges have reached
the adjudicative stage is a clear-cut recognition within the NLRB procedure of the fact that a charging party does not seek review altruistically to vindicate a nebulous public interest, 2 but instead to assert
his own interest through enforcement of his statutorily-protected right
to be free from unfair labor practices. 63 Hence in a case involving
57 See Jaffe, The Public Right Dogma, 59 HARv. L. Rav. 720, 726 (1946).
58 Ibid.
59 Id. at 725.
60 Cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10 (1940): "The Act is essentially

remedial. It does not carry a penal program declaring the described unfair labor practices to be crimes. The Act does not prescribe penalties or fines in vindication of public
rights or provide indemnity against community losses as distinguished from the protection and compensation of employees."
61 Cf. 29 U.S.C. 160(c) (1958).
62 Marine Engineers attempted to negate the import of this right to review by describing the right in terms related to a judicially created theory of "private Attorneys
General." See Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942); FCC v. Sanders
Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1940); Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134
F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). But to speak of a theory only in terms of the language
used by courts to justify allowing private persons the ability to seek judicial review
of issues in which they have a substantial interest but no substantive legal right, is
perhaps to confuse the justification with the real interest being protected. Such a justification is necessary because of the general requirement that an individual interest
be shown to exist before a federal court will exercise jurisdiction. Perkins v. Lukens
Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Muskrat
v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
63 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958). "The affirmative action that is authorized is to make
these remedies effective in the redress of the employees' right to assure them selforganization and freedom in representation
-.
...
NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 258 (1939). See also Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10-11
(1940). Cf. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
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federal preemption under the NLRA, the Supreme Court minimized
any realistic difference between the interests being protected in NLRA
cases and in cases brought in the courts by private initiative. 64 If,
then, individual remedial interests can be protected under the NLRA
without infringing upon the public interest, they should definitely be
so served. The fact that victims of unfair labor practices are completely dependent upon the adequacy of Board proceedings for relief
argues strongly in favor of affording full procedural protections whenever possible. 5
It is in light of these policy considerations that one must view the
recognition of Marine Engineers that if the charging party's right to
review on the record is not to become illusory there must be an opportunity for him to know the reasons for the trial examiner's decision
and to record his own evidence and arguments. 66 In both Textile
Workers and Teamsters, for example, the Bbard's decision was founded
on extra-record information,13 some of which the charging party never
had the opportunity to examine or refute. 68 Aside from possible harm
64 Cf. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 494-96, 498 (1953): "It often is
convenient to describe particular claims as involving public or private rights, and this
handy classification is doubtless valid for some purposes. But usually the real signifi.
cance and legal consequence of each term will depend upon its context and the nature
of the interests it is invoked to distinguish .... Federal law has largely developed and
expanded as public law .... It consists of substituting federal statute law applied by
administrative procedures in the public interest in the place of individual suits in
courts to enforce common law doctrines of public right .... The conflict [between
enforcement by state courts or by the NLRB of the right to bargain collectively] lies
in remedies, not rights." Id. at 494-96, 498.
65 See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951).
66 See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 176 (1941) (dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Stone).
67 In both cases, supplemental decisions were issued by the Board to conform to
the courts' demands for a demonstration that the denial of a hearing was in the public
interest. In the Textile Workers supplemental decision, 135 N.L.R.B. 472 (1962), the
Board listed such considerations for approving the order as the policy of encouraging
settlements, the risks of ultimate loss after protracted litigation, and the evaluation
of "all the factors, legal and factual elicited by the administrative investigation ...."
135 N.L.R.B. at 475. The latter, however, was extra-record information, to which the
charging party was not permitted to reply.
In Teamsters, the contents of the reports on which the Board relied were not disclosed to the union. See Brief for Appellant, p. 9, Local 282, Teamsters Union v.
NLRB, 339 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1964). Significantly, in rewriting its decision for the
approval of the court, the Board apparently found that the record was incomplete
and attempted to ascertain additional information by telephone. Id. at 8.
68 Compare "No other major problem of administrative law surpasses in practical
importance the problem of use of extra-record information in an adjudication," 2
DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 15.01, at 338 (1958), with "If information has come to an
agency's attention in the course of investigation of the pending case, it should be adduced only by the ordinary process; it should be considered only if it is in the record .... The parties, then, are entitled to be apprised of the data upon which the
agency is acting. They are entitled not only to refute but, what in this situation is

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:786

to the parties, such a procedure in effect contravenes the statutory
scheme by permitting the prosecutor to usurp the Board's fact-finding
and adjudicatory functions. 69
Use of the allocation of functions between the General Counsel and
the trial examiner as a reference would provide the most appropriate
resolution to the problem of the charging party's right to a hearing. The
major objection to permitting hearings as of right has been a fear that it
would impair the Board's ability to screen frivolous and repetitious
complaints. But that function can be performed without interference
by the General Counsel, who is empowered to investigate and dismiss
charges at any time before the trial examiner's hearing begins. The
General Counsel's reasons for dismissal may relate solely to his concept
of the public interest: it is his task to make an unfettered independent
determination on that issue in each case.7 0 But once the case proceeds
to a hearing he loses absolute control. Hence the concern of the Second
Circuit in Teamsters for the retention of the General Counsel's flexi71
bility is misplaced once the complaint reaches the hearing stage.
Even were the General Counsel given discretionary authority to
withdraw a case at that stage, by the time a complaint had been issued
there would have been ample opportunity for the charge to have been
screened and for flexible negotiation with a violator to have occured.
Board statistics, in fact, indicate that pre-complaint screening is in
practice the NLRB's most effective tool for exercising administrative
discretion with maximum flexibility. 72 Moreover, the conservation of
Board resources has not been seriously frustrated by the hearing
requirement laid down in Marine Engineers, for it affects an insignificant
73
portion of the total case load.

usually more important, to supplement, explain, and give different perspective to the
facts upon which the agency relies." ATr'Y GEN. COMMiTrEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, AI)MINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong..

1st Sess. 72 (1941).
69 See discussion of the separation of Board functions, note 4 supra.
70 See statement of the General Counsel, supra note 53, for a discussion of the considerations entering the making of decisions by the General Counsel, which decisions
may purposely not coincide with those anticipated from the Board.
71 339 F.2d at 799.
72 Of the 13,219 cases submitted in 1962, 11,141 were settled by adjustment, withdrawal or dismissal prior to issuance of a complaint. Approximately 750 additional
cases were settled after issuance of a complaint. 27 NLRB ANN. REP. 268 (1962). Only
7% of the total settlements in fiscal year 1963 were effected over the objections of the
charging party. Brief for Appellee, p. 10, Local 282, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 339
F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1964).
73 While precise statistics concerning the number of opposed settlements entered
into at the adjudicative stage do not exist, an estimate may be attempted by applying
the seven per cent opposition rate, supra note 72, to the number of cases disposed ot
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It is clear that the desire for administrative centralization and
flexibility is not necessarily incompatible with the protection of procedural rights. In this instance, permitting a hearing as of right after
a hearing has commenced does not interfere with the performance of
the General Counsel's statutory responsibilities in the most efficient manner possible. The right to be heard does not require a full evidentiary
hearing on the merits. 74 Furthermore, under the statutory scheme the

trial examiner and the Board are required to resolve the public interest
question again after the first-stage filtering process is complete; the
explicit purpose of the division of NLRB functions in the 1947
amendments was to promote independent consideration of the various
interests involved. 75 If the trial examiner and the Board are to make
an informed independent determination of, the public interest, they
should have the opportunity to hear those parties whose interests will
be affected by the decision. Once the trial examiner's hearing commences, therefore, the charging party's interest in presenting his case
76
deserves recognition.
CONCLUSION

If it is conceded that the charging party has a right to a hearing,
there remains the problem of how that right is to be enforced. If the
Board has entered a final order the statute grants clear-cut authority
during the trial examiner's hearing. In 1962, 263 cases fell into the latter category,
indicating a probable additional annual case-load of approximately fifteen to twenty
cases. See note 72 supra and authorities cited therein.
74 The issue presented for resolution at the settlement proposal stage is not the
ultimate decision on the complaint, but rather whether the public interest calls for the
acceptance of the settlement. The charging party may desire to object to only one
evidentiary point on which the decision to accept the settlement rests. Further, his
objection may go only to the remedy, requiring only an opportunity to place the
reasons for his objections on the record. His paramount interest is simply an opportunity to know and refute the arguments and findings upon which the Board might
be willing to accept a settlement unsatisfactory to him.
75 See note 4 supra.
76 There will of course be some situations in which "the possibly slight merit of a
charge is outweighed by the sure and speedy concessions, the industrial harmony restored, and the savings of Board resources which a settlement can achieve." Local 282,
Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 1964). However, the true antagonists in the case of an unfair labor practice are the respondent and the charging
party. A "sure and speedy concession" which is opposed by the charging party is certainly no assurance of industrial harmony. Teamsters exemplifies in fact something
less than expeditious achievement of industrial harmony through the imposition of
an unwanted settlement: the union was still on strike over four months after the
"settlement" was reached, some eight months after the filing of the charge. Brief of
Appellant, supra note 67, p. 51a. While procedural fairness will not guarantee that the
losing party will be acquiescent or cooperative, it would tend to minimize suspicion
and distrust concerning the decision-making process and would therefore operate to
encourage, rather than deter, the acceptance of Board determinations.
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to the appellate courts to review the decision; 77 but if the circumstances
are such that the charging party would ordinarily have no right to
judicial review, as when the complaint is dismissed or when informal
settlement without a "final order" of the Board is obtained,7 8 there
may be additional vexing problems. Two recent cases, however, indicate that courts may intervene when direct judicial review is either
unavailable or ineffective to redress a wrong. In both cases jurisdiction was premised upon the district court's statutory jurisdiction over
civil matters "arising under any act of Congress regulating commerce ....
In International Union Industrial Workers v. Rothmans o
a charging party petitioned for injunctive relief to require the Board to
hear complaints even though the regional director had entered into
an informal settlement over the objection of the charging party. Review
under the NLRA was unavailable because the settlement was informal
and did not include a final order from the Board. The court reasoned
that since Congress felt the need for judicial review from a final order
of the Board even after procedural protections had been afforded by
a hearing and by intra-agency review, "it is difficult to understand
how the Defendants can argue that a decision of the General Counsel,
[which is just as "final" to the charging party] as in the instant case,
is not reviewable." 8' The court ordered the Board to grant the requested
hearing. Similarly, in Deering-Milliken, Inc. v. Johnsons2 an employer
who was a respondent in a pending unfair labor practice proceeding
sued for an injunction to prevent a regional director from proceeding
with hearings on the charge. The district court held that further
hearings, due to the lapse of over five years since the complaint had
originally been filed, would be "vexatious, burdensome, harassing,"
and an abuse of the powers of the Board.8 3 In remanding, the court
'-79

29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1958).
Cf. Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 295 F.2d 526 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 813
(1962); Vapor Blast Mfg. Co. v. Madden, 280 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1960); Thompson
Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 133 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1943).
79 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1958). Cf. Capitol Service Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954) (held
to give district courts jurisdiction in civil actions arising under the NLRA).
80 209 F. Supp. 295 (D.D.C. 1962).
81 Id. at 297.
82 193 F. Supp. 741 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961).
83 193 F. Supp. at 743. The original complaint had been issued on December 4, 1956,
and the record necessary for a determination by the Board was completed and closed
on November 30, 1958. Instead of issuing an order, however, the Board kept the hearings
open at the request of the General Counsel so that proof might be offered as to the
relationship existing in 1956-1957 between the plaintiff and certain other textile manufacturing corporations. The case was again submitted to the Board for a decision on
the merits on April 5, 1960, but was remanded once again on February 15, 1961, for
further hearings.
77
78
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of appeals agreed that the right to review after issuance of a final
order was ineffective in protecting "the right to have the proceedings
brought to a conclusion with reasonable dispatch ... "84 and that the
court could therefore properly intervene in the administrative proceeding.
The basic approach of these cases appears valid. Although the NLRA
review provision purports to be exclusive, judicial remedies may in
some circumstances be necessary to redress infringement by the Board
on the rights of private parties for which there is no effective administrative remedy.8 5 Administrative action, short 6f a final order, may
not ordinarily be subject to judicial review, but such action may have
significance equal to that of a final order with respect to the interests
of a charging party.8 6 The Board will review objections to any such
action, but it cannot do so effectively absent the opportunity of the
charging party to be heard. Since judicial relief is unavailable to protect
the right to be heard when no final order is issued, the district courts
should be willing to provide injunctive relief when the right to be
heard is denied.
Requiring a hearing to allow a charging party to place on the record
his reasons for objecting to a consent order is unlikely to undermine
the efficient use of Board resources; if it does prove onerous, the
burden can easily be lessened by a change in Board regulations.
Meanwhile, by assuring the right to be heard the Board will eliminate
the abuses associated with the use of extra-record material and by
gaining access to full information improve the likelihood of fair decisions. Further, because aggrieved persons will be afforded more comprehensive procedural protection, greater respect for the Board's
administrative process will be promoted, the cooperation of charging
parties encouraged and the NLRB thereby enabled more nearly to
accomplish its statutory duty to resolve labor disputes in the public
interest.
295 F.2d at 864.
85 See 295 F.2d at 861-63.
86 The Court has previously cut through such distinctions to examine agency action
in light of its practical effects on the parties. For example, in Rochester Tel. Corp. v.
United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939), the Court eliminated the then prevailing distinction
between "affirmative" and "negative" orders as a criterion for determining reviewability
of agency action, pointing out that a "negative order" which retains the status quo is as
determinative of rights as an "affirmative order" which compels a change.
84

